Could you produce the record — and prove what your systems did?
After an incident, the loudest question is what your systems captured and whether you can produce it. This is a focused 10-question read across the response-and-record chain — retrieval, retention, routing-to-location, integration, and end-to-end testing. Each is a design hypothesis to test against your own facility, not a deficiency asserted; it surfaces where your account can and can’t yet be evidenced. Yes = in place, integrated, and provable; Partial = it exists but coverage or the record is inconsistent; No = not in place; N/A = not applicable. Count only Yes; each Partial names the gap. The band thresholds are our design decision, not a regulation’s — and nothing here implies a system would have prevented what happened.
This self-assessment runs entirely in your browser. Nothing you enter is sent to us or stored. No email required.
Retrieval & the record
After an event, can one authorized person retrieve the full physical-evidence package — activation, location, response, access, video — time-synchronized, without stitching systems together by hand?
Only by manually pulling from separate systems.
Is your video retention long enough, and your preservation process fast enough, that the record still exists when the investigation or litigation asks for it?
Retention is short, or preservation is ad hoc.
Routing & coordination
When an alert fires, does it route to a location — does the responder know where — or only that something happened?
Zone-level only, or location is often wrong.
Are your duress, access, video, and lockdown one coordinated chain, or separate systems that have to be reconciled by hand after the fact?
Partly integrated; some links are manual.
During an active event, do lockdown and mass notification fire on the triggering event — not depend on someone remembering to start them?
They exist but are manually initiated.
Detection & its honest limits
Where you use weapons screening, is it scoped to what it actually addresses — a defined share of the entrance threat — rather than treated as the whole answer?
Treated as the primary answer; interior response is thin.
Is access control matched to the threat of each area — ED, behavioral, maternal/infant, non-public entrances — rather than uniform across the building?
Uniform, or the at-risk areas aren’t distinguished.
Testing — the whole chain, not the device
Does testing cover the whole chain end to end — activation through retrievable record — or only individual devices?
Devices are tested; the end-to-end response isn’t.
After your last incident or drill, was the whole chain re-tested — or was a component added and the chain assumed closed?
A component was added; the chain wasn’t re-tested together.
The still-open gap — the question most facilities haven’t asked
If the next event took the same path as the last one, would anything you’ve changed since actually close it — or would the same links break again?
Unsure — the change addressed a component, not the path.
Your account looks producible — confirm it holds whole
Retrieval, retention, routing, and integration look coordinated. The value now is confirming the Partials you flagged are truly closed — especially that one person can retrieve the full time-synchronized record without stitching systems by hand, and that retention outlasts the investigation window.
The chain has gaps that surface exactly when an investigation tests it
The pieces exist, but the seams — routing-to-location, alert-to-camera, retention and preservation, or end-to-end testing — are where an inquiry or litigation would find the account in pieces. The Partial notes point to where to look first.
After an event, you may not be able to produce what happened
There are real breaks between an event and a retrievable, defensible account of it. Start here, with security, risk, and facilities together — before the next investigation, not during it.
There are real breaks between an event and a retrievable, defensible account of it. Start here, with security, risk, and facilities together — before the next investigation, not during it.
This self-assessment surfaces where an after-incident account can and can’t yet be evidenced; it points to gaps in the response-and-record chain, it is not a security design and not a compliance determination. It does not assess your incident response, investigation, legal, or clinical program. The band thresholds are a declared design decision, not drawn from any regulation. We recognize the threat and design for it; nothing here implies a system would have prevented any incident. Current as of Accreditation 360 (eff. Jan 1 2026).
This surfaces where a program can’t yet prove it functions; it is not a compliance score and not a survey. Count only Yes. Each Partial is a named gap — the note identifies the specific condition that prevents a full Yes. N/A does not penalize. Responses stay in your browser and are not transmitted.